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1 Introduction
An historically unprecedented 142 women MPs
were elected to the British House of Commons
on 6 May 2010. Of these, 81 are Labour, 48
Conservative, seven Liberal Democrat, one SNP
and four represent parties in Northern Ireland.
The election also saw the first Muslim women
MPs in any party; the first black woman MP, and
an ‘out’ lesbian MP in the Conservative Party.
The Green Party also achieved their first ever
MP in the UK Parliament, who is also a woman.
The UK meets the European regional average of
women in lower houses, and beats the world
average of 19.1 per cent. Yet, at less than one-
quarter of the House of Commons, the UK ranks
joint 52nd in the global league table, behind
countries as diverse as Rwanda (56 per cent);
Sweden (46 per cent); South Africa (45 per cent);
Argentina (39 per cent) and Portugal (27 per
cent). The overall increase in the number of
women MPs at Westminster since the last
general election in 2005 is also tiny – a net gain
of only 2.5 per cent. And this, crucially, from a
General Election where all the main parties were
publicly committed to selecting greater numbers
of women candidates – David Cameron
(Conservative Party Leader and now Prime
Minister) made it a central tenet of the
modernisation of the Conservative Party – and
where the opportunity to select (and elect) more
women was enhanced by many more MPs than
usual standing down following the parliamentary
expenses scandal of 2009.
2 Factors which influence women’s descriptive
representation
For those seeking sex parity at Westminster, the
2010 election is an opportunity missed. So, what
went wrong? There appears to be no single
answer for women’s descriptive representation
that holds for all times and places. Countries
with widely differing economic, social, cultural
and political structures can have similar
numbers of women representatives and the
reverse also holds true. However, there are a
large number of hypotheses that purport to
explain the variations in women’s descriptive
representation. These can be broken down into
cultural, socioeconomic and political factors, as
Box 1 summarises. None, in themselves, have
been found to be sufficient. For example, Pippa
Norris (2004) found that electoral system effects
are strongest in post-industrial societies and
weakest in developing countries, while the use of
sex quotas in some countries in Africa, for
example Rwanda, Mozambique and South
Africa, help explain their position among the top
ranked countries.
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Box 1 Hypotheses for women’s descriptive representation
Cultural factors which increase women’s representation:
z An egalitarian culture
z A higher degree of secularisation
z The length of time since women’s enfranchisement and the longer the duration, the
higher the proportion of women’s representation.
Socioeconomic factors which increase women’s representation:
z Greater participation of women in the public sphere
z Greater participation by women in the professions from which politicians are recruited
z A larger role by the state in both the public and private spheres (i.e. where the state is
social democratic, rather than neoliberal), for instance provision of childcare enhances
women’s opportunities for political participation.
Political factors which increase women’s representation:
z If the presence of proportional representation electoral systems increases, and the
presence of majoritarian electoral systems decreases, this is because in majoritarian
systems, the dynamic is to select the ‘safest’ candidate, i.e. the candidate who is most
likely to win votes where the battle is between two parties in a narrow contest; in
single-member constituencies, it is also a ‘zero sum game’ between women and men
candidates, as only one candidate, either a male or a female candidate – can win
z A higher district magnitude (number of seats). This is because parties do not have to
select between a woman or a man; and the absence of women makes a ticket look
‘unbalanced’
z A higher party magnitude (number of parties competing in the electoral system). This
is because of party competition
z The use of positive discrimination – well-designed and implemented sex quotas make a
significant difference
z The presence of women (predisposed towards women’s numerical representation) in
top decision-making bodies within a party
z The more left-wing a party, the greater the likelihood of the selection of women as
parliamentary candidates.
And in party democracies:
z The more centralised the party selection process, the greater the ability of party
leaders, when willing, to encourage the selection of women as parliamentary candidates
z The higher the salience of the ‘women’s vote’ to a particular party, the higher
representation of women among that party’s representatives.
3 Supply and demand issues
In their groundbreaking study, Pippa Norris and
Joni Lovenduski (1995) separate out four levels
of analysis. At the first level are the systemic
factors that set the broad context: the legal,
electoral, party systems and the structure of
party competition, the strength of parties, and
the position of the parties across the ideological
divide. The second level looks towards the context
within parties – their organisation, rules and
ideology. At the third level are the individual
factors such as the resources and motivations of
aspirant candidates, as well as the attitudes of
the party selectorates. Finally, there are the
individual elections that determine the outcome
of the process for the composition of
parliaments. In Britain, systemic factors are not
significant inhibitors of women’s descriptive
representation. Women do not face legal barriers
to their election, although the ‘First Past the
Post’ (single member simple plurality, SMSP)
majoritarian electoral system used for
Westminster is widely considered to be less
favourable for women candidates than
proportional representation systems. (In a single
member constituency the selectorate have only a
single candidate to select and are likely to prefer
a candidate that is similar to existing
candidates.) Nonetheless, the recent increases in
the number of women MPs have occurred during
a period in which the electoral system has stayed
constant. More important than the electoral
system per se, then, is the acknowledgement that
the overwhelming majority of MPs elected to the
UK Parliament are representatives of political
parties. In such contexts, the question of ‘who
our representatives are’ is one of whom our
political parties select as their candidates.
The outcome of particular political parties’
selection processes is often understood in terms
of the interaction between the supply of
applicants wishing to pursue a political career
and the demands of selectors who choose
candidates on the basis of their preferences and
perceptions of abilities, qualifications and
perceived electability (Norris and Lovenduski
1995). Supply-side factors likely to limit the
overall level of women seeking selection include
gendered socialisation and the sexual division of
labour. Women are, on average, likely to have
fewer resources than men, whether that is the
necessary free time to engage in politics, money
to fund selection and election campaigns, and/or
lower levels of political ambition, confidence and
experience. On the demand-side, women have
been found to suffer from selectorate
discrimination, that is, a lack of party demand
for women candidates (Shepherd-Robinson and
Lovenduski 2002). This can take different forms.
Direct discrimination refers to the positive or
negative judgement of people on the basis of
characteristics seen as common to their group,
rather than as individuals; it reflects the
attitudes of the selectors, and can be seen where
gender discriminatory questions are posed
during the selection process (Norris and
Lovenduski 1995). Indirect discrimination refers
to instances where the idea of what constitutes a
‘good MP’ count against women – where, for
example, party selectorates prefer candidates
with resources primarily associated with men
and masculinity. Imputed discrimination is
where party members may be unwilling to choose
a woman candidate because they are concerned
that by so doing they would lose votes. Here, the
discrimination reflects what the selectors
perceive to be the attitudes of the electorate.
The relative importance of supply- and demand-
side explanations for women’s legislative
recruitment at Westminster has varied over time
and between political parties. Historically, it was
said simply that there were an insufficient
number of qualified women in the supply pool
and as soon as greater numbers of women
participated in the public sphere, especially in
those professions such as law that constitute the
recruiting grounds for politicians, then more
women would seek political candidature. These
women would, in turn, be selected by parties and,
ultimately, elected as MPs. However, when
women’s participation in the public sphere did
increase, and in the absence of a corresponding
rise in the number of women MPs, the argument
was transformed. The problem was now
portrayed as a failure on behalf of qualified
women to seek selection. This was said to be
particularly true for some parties, namely the
Conservative Party (Kittilson 2006: 2; Norris and
Lovenduski 1995). Today, there is more of a
consensus, at least among feminist political
scientists, if not among all political actors, that
the problem at Westminster is less one of supply
and more one of demand.
This is not to suggest that gender and politics
scholars should not be concerned about the size
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of the women’s supply pool; nor seek to ensure
diversity among women in that supply pool. The
increasing professionalisation and narrowing of
the UK political class is widely noted and rarely
approved of. Nor does an acknowledgment that
women are, on average, likely to have fewer
resources than men, whether that is the free
time to engage in politics (on top of working and
caring for their families), money to fund their
selection and election campaigns, less political
ambition, confidence and experience, mean that
reforms cannot be made to the culture and
workings of politics. Political reforms can make
this more ‘women’ and ‘family’ friendly: there
could be better training, more chances of
internships and better equal opportunities
practices at Westminster. For example, the
House could sit ‘business hours’; there could be
‘job-shares’ for Ministers, if not MPs; maternity
and paternity leave could be provided; and
campaigning conduct could also be agreed
between the parties. All of these changes
acknowledge MPs’ private lives to a much
greater extent. And while creche facilities are in
the process of being made available to MPs on
the parliamentary estate, the new funding
arrangements for MPs should also acknowledge
women’s greater responsibility for family life.
Even so, and in the absence of many of these
reforms, it needs to be restated that there are
plenty of women aspirant candidates who already
have the necessary resources and motivation; all
of the parties have enough women seeking
selection to select women for at least half of
their held and/or winnable seats. At each
election for the main two parties, we are
probably talking about identifying just over 50
women, competent and capable of being an MP.
4 Equality rhetoric, promotion and guarantees
For the 2010 election, all the main three parties
were publicly committed to increasing the
diversity of their MPs and had expended
considerable political capital on introducing and
implementing a range of measures to that end.
There are three main strategies available:
equality rhetoric, equality promotion and equality
guarantees, as Table 1 outlines. Equality rhetoric
and promotion are widespread and largely
uncontested in all of the main UK political
parties, whereas the adoption of equality
guarantees is both more limited and contested.
Equality rhetoric consists of party statements,
oral and written, that publicly acknowledge the
claim for women’s descriptive representation. It
aims to exhort women to participate in party
politics and to seek political candidature.
Equality rhetoric can also help persuade party
selectorates to choose women as candidates.
Accordingly, equality rhetoric has the potential
to impact on both the supply and demand sides
of legislative recruitment, although it is more
likely to impact on the former (Lovenduski 2005:
92). It also constitutes an opportunity around
which gender equality advocates, inside and
outside of parties, can mobilise.
Equality promotion measures attempt to bring
those who are currently under-represented into
political competition. It refers to a range of
activities and measures that provide women with
the necessary resources to successfully compete
in the political recruitment process. As such, this
approach is largely underpinned by supply-side
arguments: women are regarded as deficient in
the resources desired by party selectorates. The
most widespread example of equality promotion
is candidate training, something all the main UK
political parties provide. Often, this is women-
only. The provision of training for women is,
however, subject to three main criticisms. First,
aspirant women candidates are known to declare
that they, ‘don’t need any more training’; second,
training women to compete according to the
current rules of the recruitment game does little
to unpack parties’ assumptions about what
makes a good candidate (Harrison 2006); and
finally, training candidates may be insufficient to
negate selectorate discrimination against
women. Other equality promotion measures,
such as the provision of financial assistance, take
on greater significance where the cost of fighting
party selections is high.
Equality promotion can also take the form of ‘soft
targets’, for example Labour’s intention to
achieve a Parliamentary Labour party with 35 per
cent women following the 2005 General Election.
It can also refer to measures that, on first glance,
look like equality guarantees, but whose finer
details and/or implementation reveal that they
fall short (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).
Measures that merely ‘facilitate’ or ‘encourage’
or ‘expect’ the greater selection of women remain
examples of equality promotion, albeit strong
forms. Party rules that set a minimum quota at
the nominating or shortlisting stages of candidate
selection have the potential to increase the
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numbers of women selected but this does not
guarantee that they will. Nor do they guarantee
that any selected women candidates will be
subsequently elected. Qualitatively distinct,
equality guarantees require an increase in the
number or proportion of particular
parliamentarians and/or make a particular social
characteristic a necessary qualification for office
(following Lovenduski 2005: 90–1, with emphasis
added). Importantly, equality guarantees create
an artificial demand, although they may also
indirectly encourage an increase in the supply of
women, as women perceive a new demand on
behalf of a particular political party.
The distinction between equality promotion and
equality guarantees can be further clarified
through considering the implementation of
Labour’s All Women Shortlists (AWS). In 1997,
2005 and 2010, Labour employed AWS in a
proportion of its vacant-held seats and winnable
seats. This strategy means, first, that all
candidates seeking selection in these particular
constituencies are women. Second, because the
selected candidate is contesting a Labour-held or
winnable seat, she should – all other things being
equal – be elected as an MP.
For the 2010 UK general election, all the main
political parties encouraged women to come
forward and helped them become candidates, not
least through training and mentoring – engaging
in both equality rhetoric and equality promotion.
In respect of the latter, the Liberal Democrats had
a sex-quota at the shortlisting stage of selection:
shortlists of three or four must have at least one
applicant of each sex; shortlists of five must have
at least two applicants of each sex. Where
necessary, the list would be increased rather than
decreased to conform to the gender balance,
provided all applicants meet the minimum
standards. The Conservatives introduced a series
of reforms, including the creation of a priority list
of candidates (A list), of which 50 per cent would
be female, the greater use of primaries and a
50:50 sex quota at the shortlisting stage. All of
these measures increased the chances that more
women would come in front of those who choose
parliamentary candidates. But both the Liberal
Democrats and the Conservative parties rejected
the logic of equality guarantees, no doubt because
of party ideology (not least ideas of merit) and
local party autonomy. Despite Cameron’s
apparent, and belated, embracing of AWS for
some post-January 2010 selections, there were
none. Moreover, Conservative AWS would have
been happenstance rather than an example of an
‘equality guarantee’; using the party’s by-election
rules the ‘three’ candidates from whom a local
association would select would just happen to be
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Table 1 Strategies to increase the diversity of candidates
Type of strategy Definition Examples Impact
Equality rhetoric Public acceptance of Found in party campaign Affects selectorate and 
claims for representation platforms; party political aspirant candidates’ attitudes 
discourse; speeches and and beliefs
writings of political leaders 
(exhortation of women to 
come forward and seek 
selection)
Equality promotion Attempts to bring those Special training; financial Enhances aspirant candidates’ 
who are currently under- assistance; the setting of resources and motivation; 
represented into political targets affects selectorate attitudes
competition
Equality guarantees Requires an increase in Party quotas, legislative Creates an artificial demand; 
the number or proportion quotas; reserved seats, All may increase supply
of particular candidates; Women Shortlists (AWS)
makes a particular social 
characteristic a necessary 
qualification for office
Source Childs et al. (2005), citing Lovenduski (2005).
all women. In contrast, the Labour party adopted
once again equality guarantees – measures
designed to require that women are selected.
So what difference did the various equality
strategies and the extra effort make this time
around? The numbers of Liberal Democrat
women MPs declined from nine to seven, as the
electoral swing went against them; the Labour
party’s total of women MPs fell too, by 17, from
98 to 81 (31 per cent of their parliamentary
party); only the Conservatives increased their
number – more than doubling to 48, from 17 (16
per cent of their parliamentary party). A welcome
increase, but Conservative gains fall short of their
expectation of some 60 women MPs. And
notwithstanding these developments, the inter-
party asymmetry in women’s descriptive
representation, in Labour’s favour, at
Westminster remains. And in those 2010
retirement seats – the unexpected seats freed up
by the parliamentary expenses scandal, and
which, all other things being equal, a party is
likely to hold – the percentage of women selected
by the Conservatives was only 26 per cent
compared with Labour’s 53 per cent. Here
Labour’s use of AWS delivered. Used in more
than half of its retirement seats, all of the 23
Labour women candidates selected on AWS made
it to the Commons. Hence, at a general election
where Labour lost nearly 100 seats, the
percentage of its women MPs actually increased,
to a high of 31 per cent from 28 per cent, without
a very large loss in the number of its women MPs.
Once again, party demand – equality guarantees
operationalised through AWS – looks critical.
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Box 2 Speaker’s conference recommendations: select
23. We fully support the proposed extension of the Sex Discrimination (Election
Candidates) Act 2002 to enable the use of all-women shortlists until 2030.
24. If the political parties fail to make significant progress on women’s representation at
the 2010 general election, Parliament should give serious consideration to the
introduction of prescriptive quotas, ensuring that all political parties adopt some form
of equality guarantee in time for the following general election.
25. We recommend that all political parties registered under part 2 of the Political Parties,
Elections and Referendums Act 2000 should be required to publish details of their
candidate selections online every seven months, on 31 March and 31 October, setting
out, for each potential candidate at each stage of the selection process, the following
information: (a) the administrative region in which the selection took place; (b) the
method by which the candidate was selected; (c) whether the party: (i) currently holds
the seat for which the candidate was selected; or (ii) came second or third in the seat at
the last general election within a margin of less than 5 per cent of the votes cast; or (iii)
came second or third in the seat at the last general election within a margin of more
than 5 per cent but less than 10 per cent of the votes cast; (d) the sex of the candidate;
(e) the ethnicity of the candidate; and (f) whether the candidate is willing to identify as
a disabled person. The reports might also include the following information: (a) where
a candidate is willing to identify as a disabled person, the nature of the impairment; (b)
where a candidate is willing to state his or her sexual orientation, the sexual
orientation of the candidate; (c) the age of the candidate; (d) the occupation of the
candidate at the time of selection; and (e) the highest level of the candidate’s
educational attainment.
26. We recommend that the Government should find time for a debate on the
implementation of the Speaker’s Conference’s recommendations and progress towards
just Representation in the House of Commons in 2010, 2012, and every two years
thereafter, to 2022.
Source: House of Commons (2010) Speaker’s Conference (On Parliamentary
Representation), HC 329–1.
5 Conclusion
In the months and years to come, women’s
descriptive representation at Westminster must
not be allowed to fall off the political agenda.
There are already, in the first Queen’s Speech of
the coalition government, legislative plans to
reduce the number of seats in the House of
Commons. This will see sitting MPs fighting it
out against each other for their party’s selection;
women MPs must not be a casualty of this
reform. And if there is to be electoral system
reform, its impact on the selection and election
of women must also be addressed. Comparative
studies reveal that some systems of proportional
representation are more favourable to women’s
election than others. Disconcertingly, there is not
much sign that gender concerns like these are in
the minds of those within the Government who
will lead on these reforms. Theresa May, the new
Conservative Home Secretary and Minister for
Women and Equality, and her Liberal Democrat
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
(Minister for Equalities) for the Home Office,
Lynne Featherstone, will need to take this up
with the Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal
Democrat Leader, Nick Clegg. And it is not as if
the issue of women’s descriptive representation
has not been on the parliamentary agenda. A
Speaker’s Conference1 was established in 2007 to
consider the important issue of the
representation of women and ethnic minorities
in the House of Commons. Recommendations
reported before the 2010 general election
included, inter alia, that parties publish their
selection data and Parliament routinely debates
their progress (see Box 2).
Most importantly, although as yet apparently
unrecognised by the Government or the media,
Recommendation 24 suggests that Parliament
should ‘give serious consideration’ to prescriptive
rather than permissive quotas if ‘significant’
progress is not made at the 2010 general election
– and there was no significant progress in 2010.
Supporters of women’s political representation,
inside and outside of parties and parliament,
should mobilise now to ensure that the missed
opportunity of 2010 is not only fully appreciated
but that pressure is placed on all the party
leaders (including the future Labour leader, as
yet unknown at the time of writing) and on the
government and parliament to make good on
their commitment to adequately feminise the
House of Commons. At less than one-quarter of
all members of the UK parliament, women’s
descriptive representation remains, as before, far
from parity.
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Notes
* This article draws upon and updates Childs
(2008).
1 Speakers Conferences consider issues of
electoral law and constitutional reform.
References
Childs, S. (2008) Women and British Party Politics,
London: Routledge
Childs, S.; Lovenduski, J. and Campbell, R.
(2005) Women on Top, London: Hansard Society
Dahlerup, D. and Freidenvall, L. (2005) ‘Quotas
as a Fast Track to Equal Political
Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia
is no Longer the Model’, International Feminist
Journal of Politics 7.1: 26–48
Harrison, L. (2006) ‘Women’s Legislative
Representation – Do Political Parties Utilize a
Gendered Model of the “Good Candidate”’,
unpublished paper
Kittilson, M.C. (2006) Challenging Parties,
Changing Parliaments, Columbus: Ohio State
University Press
Lovenduski, J. (2005) Feminizing Politics,
Cambridge: Polity
Norris, P. (2004) Electoral Engineering, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (1995) Political
Recruitment, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press
Shepherd-Robinson, L. and Lovenduski, J. (2002)
Women and Candidate Selection, London: Fawcett
Society
